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This paper lays out a framework for the analysis of the risk transfer role of 
speculators on futures markets and the impact of their trading on the production 
decisions of firms. We show that when speculators diversify their portfolios over a 
large number of markets, the equilibrium risk premium converges to an asymptotic 
premium, the behaviour of which is determined by the stochastic dependence 
between the spot price and an index of average returns on other markets-the 
idiosyncratic risk arising from the variability of the spot price itself is diversified 
away. In the independent and negatively dependent cases this diversification of risk 
leads to a Pareto improving property. (” 1985 Academic Press. Inc 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Futures markets may be viewed as an institutional mechanism through 
which speculators can perform two roles: first, that of risk transfer, and 
second, that of information gathering. The exchanges themselves have 
traditionally emphasised the importance of the former, while economists 
have tended to focus their attention on the latter.’ 
The exchanges point out that firms involved in the production and 
processing of certain commodities would, in the absence of a futures 
market, incur over and aboy.;: the standard costs of production, the sub- 
stantial risk costs arising from the wide fluctuations in the underlying com- 
modity’s price. If futures markets can through the mechanism of hedging 
and the trading of speculators provide such firms with price insurance at 
substantially smaller cost, then more output can be made available at less 
cost to the consumer. Under what conditions is such an argument valid? 
Few attempts have been made in the economic literature to develop a 
* Research support from the National Science Foundation (SES-8200432) is gratefully 
acknowledged. We also thank Stephen Ross, Doug Breeden and participants in workshops at 
Yale, Columbia, Northwestern and Pennsylvania for helpful discussions. 
‘See, for example, Williams 1161 and more recently Grossman [6], Danthine [S] and 
Bray [3]. 
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formal theory that explains how speculators might at reasonable cost carry 
such price risks and what the welfare effects might be (if any) from the 
introduction of a futures market. In a lucid article on the role of futures 
markets Keynes [8] argued that speculators spread their risks over many 
markets and focus their attention on the average return obtained on these 
markets. A similar argument was made by Knight [9, Chap. S] in his 
well-known chapter entitled “Structures and Methods for Meeting Uncer- 
tainty.” 
This paper presents a theoretical framework in which this risk transfer 
role of futures markets can be analysed. We formalise the idea that 
speculators are specialists in the activity of risk bearing and that, unlike 
producers who face price risks individually or in small numbers, they face 
risks in large numbers and are enabled thereby to exploit the special 
technology for handling risks embodied in the principle of diversification 
and, in the extreme case, the law of large numbers. A futures market thus 
induces a kind of division of labor in which speculators specialise in the 
activity of risk bearing while firms concentrate on the activity of produc- 
tion. 
The basic framework for the analysis is a partial equilibrium model of an 
industry with a finite number of firms. After introducing some preliminary 
concepts in Section 2, we consider in Section 3 the equilibrium that arises 
when the sole mechanism for selling a firm’s output consists of a spot 
market. As in the paper of Danthine [S] we make the simplifying 
assumption that price fluctuations on the spot market arise solely from 
demand side fluctuations-only with this assumption have we been able to 
establish the qualitative properties of the spot-futures market equilibrium 
in Sections 46. With this assumption, as first shown by Danthine [S], the 
production and futures trading decisions of firms are separable (Lemma 2 
in Section 4)-an important simplifying property which ceases to hold in 
general when the output of firms is random. 
In Section 3, under the assumption that firms are run by risk averse 
managers who maximise the expected utility of their profit, we establish the 
existence of a spot market equilibrium and show that the associated output 
.? is less than a certain critical output level x* which would arise if firms 
could perfectly insure their price risks at an actuarily fair price. 
In Section 4 we introduce a futures market and the collection of agents 
called speculators. The latter are viewed as agents (or firms) with a sub- 
stantial pool of investable capital spread over a broad array of markets, 
whose concern is to maximise the expected utility of the average return 
obtained on these markets. Like the classical marine insurance 
underwriters, they balance many disparate risks against one another to 
obtain a fairly predictable average return. Producers, in addition to deter- 
mining the output to be sold on the spot market, can now also decide the 
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extent to which this output is to be hedged by the sale of futures contracts. 
We show that a joint equilibrium of the spot and futures markets exists 
(Proposition 4) and that in the normal case where producers are short 
hedgers the introduction of a futures market leads to an increase in the 
equilibrium output (Proposition 5) or equivalently to a decrease in the 
equilibrium risk premium, the equilibrium cost of risk bearing. This 
situation arises in particular when the average profits (A,) earned by 
speculators on the other markets on which they trade are independent of or 
negatively dependent on the spot market equilibrium price (Proposition 6). 
Section 4 concludes with an instructive example of a joint spot-futures 
market equilibrium which contains the example of a spot market 
equilibrium given in Section 3 as a special case. The von 
Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions of producers and speculators 
exhibit constant absolute risk aversion and the underlying random 
variables are joint normally distributed. We show that the condition which 
determines equilibrium output reduces to an expression for the equilibrium 
risk premium (Eq. (11)). This expression consists of two terms. The first 
term measures the premium required by producers and speculators to 
cover the risks arising from the variability of the spot price itself (the 
idiosyncratic risk). The second term measures the premium required by 
speculators to cover the other risk involved in entering the futures market, 
namely, that arising from the covariance of the spot price (4) with the 
average return (A,) on their portfolio of investments on the other n - 1 
markets on which they trade (the covariance risk). We show that the 
idiosyncratic risk premium is driven to zero as speculators diversify their 
portfolios over a broader array of markets (n + a). Equilibrium output is 
thus asymptotically determined by the covariance risk premium. 
This result is generalised to the case of an arbitrary joint distribution for 
the underlying random variables in Section 5. To make this generalisation 
we make use of an important concept of stochastic dependence 
(Definition 3) first introduced by Lehmann [lo], which generalises the 
concept of independence for a pair of random variables to a concept of 
positive or negative dependence. In Proposition 7 we show that if the 
sequence of average returns A, converges in probability to an asymptotic 
average return A*, then the equilibrium risk premium converges to an 
asymptotic risk premium S* which depends solely on the risk arising from 
the stochastic dependence between the spot price 4 and the asymptotic 
average return A*. The idiosyncratic risk is thus asymptotically diversified 
away. In particular when (4, A *) are independent, 6* is zero and the 
limiting output X coincides with x*. 
A close connection thus emerges between the results of Section 5 and the 
theory of asset pricing developed by Sharpe [lS], Ross [ 123 and others. 
For when the portfolio behaviour of speculators on a broad array of 
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markets is explicitly introduced, the risk associated with the variability of 
the spot price itself becomes diversifiable risk. The nondiversifiable risk 
arises from the stochastic dependence between 4 and A*. In view of the 
asymptotic nature of the argument, our approach is more directly related 
to the arbitrage pricing theory of Ross, where the common random factor 
(index) plays a role similar to that of the average return A, in our model. 
Section 6 presents a brief analysis of the welfare effect of a futures 
market. Proposition 8 shows that if the equilibrium cost of risk bearing is 
sufficiently reduced then the introduction of a futures market leads to a 
Pareto improvement-the welfare of producers, consumers and speculators 
being increased. Since this result will not in general cover the asymptotic 
independent case of Proposition 7 where the futures market provides com- 
plete actuarily fair price insurance, in the last remark we show how this 
case can be covered using Kaldor’s compensation principle. 
2. PRELIMINARY CONCEPTS 
Consider an industry composed of m > 1 identical firms each producing 
y units of output of a single perishable commodity by incurring a known 
cost c(y). Each firm makes its production decision in the spring; output 
appears in the fall, at which time the whole supply is offered for sale to 
consumers.’ However, in the spring firms are uncertain what consumer 
demand will be in the fall. To formalise the idea that consumer demand is 
random we introduce the following standard framework for the analysis of 
uncertainty. 
Let (Q, 9,9) denote a probability space. 52 is the set of states of nature, 
,9 is a a-field of subsets of 52 and Y is a probability measure on 9. Let 
4(-u, o) denote the demand price that consumers will pay for the total 
amount x>, 0 when the state of nature is o E 52. The cost and demand 
functions c( . ) and d(. ) are assumed to have the following properties. 
ASSUMPTION 1 (Cost Function). c: R + + R + satisfies (i) c E V’( R + ), 
(ii) c(0) = 0, 0 6 c'(0) <g < x, c’( .) is strictly increasing on R+, (iii) 
c’(y)-a as y+cc. 
ASSUMPTION 2 (Demand Function). 4: R+ x Q --t R+ satisfies (i) d(., w) 
is continuous on R +, VcooE, 4(x, .) is measurable on 9, VXER+, (ii) 
qh(., CO) is strictly decreasing on R+, VUIEQ, (iii)s<&O, o)<ix< cc, 
’ Since the good is perishable the current supply is determined solely by this period’s out- 
put-there is no carryover from the previous period or into a subsequent period (see Magi11 
and Benhabib [ 111). 
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Vw~l.2, (iv) P(oESZI#(X,O)#$,)>O, VXER+ where $,= 
SC2 4(x, 0) dP(o). 
Assumption 1 asserts that there are no fixed costs, and marginal cost is 
positive, increasing and grows without bound as output is indefinitely 
increased.3 Assumption 2 asserts that the demand price is positive, boun- 
ded above and strictly decreasing. For each output x the demand price 
I$~ = ($(x, o), o E Sz) is a nontrivial random variable so that the variance of 
the random variable d,X is positive. 
A particular level of output plays a special role in the analysis that 
follows-this output level serves to reveal some important qualitative 
properties of both the spot market equilibrium output (Section 3) and the 
spot-futures market equilibrium output (Sections 4-6). This is the output 
level x* which maximises the function 
x, w) dP(o)-mc 2 , 0 XER+ m 
where @(x, o) = j; $(z, o) dz, x E R +, o E Q. That x* exists and is unique 
follows at once from the fact that S(x) is strictly concave and differentiable 
and satisfies s’(0) > 0, S’(a) < 0 where c’(a/m) = Cc. Clearly s’(x*) = 0. In 
Sections 3-6 we shall find that the function S’(X) has the important 
property of exhibiting the relation between the equilibrium risk premium 
and the equilibrium level of output in either a spot market or a 
spot-futures market equilibrium. 
If a mechanism could be found which provides costless price insurance 
for the firms, so that all their output could be sold with certainty at the 
expected price, and if consumers were to value the benefits of trade on this 
market by expected consumer surplus (see Section 6) then a natural 
welfare property would be satisfied by x *, for S(x) is the sum of expected 
consumer and producer surplus (profit). We shall find that a futures 
market provides such a mechanism under certain idealised conditions. The 
first-order condition for the maximum s’(x*) = E&x*, o) - c’(x*/m) = 0 is 
related to an important empirical property of futures prices, namely, that 
the futures price is (approximately) an unbiased estimate of the subsequent 
spot price. It was an attempt to explain how this property might be 
satisfied that led to the analysis of Sections 4-6. For the earlier theory of 
Keynes [IS] and the subsequent extension by Danthine [S] predict a 
downward bias (normal backwardation) in the futures price-the premium 
3 The differentiability assumption l(i) plays an important role in establishing the qualitative 
properties of equilibrium: it is convenient but not essential for establishing existence proper- 
ties. For simplicity of exposition we have decided to retain Assumption l(i) throughout. 
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being the speculators’ reward for risk bearing-and this has not been 
consistently observed on futures markets (Working [ 1 S] ). 
In the next section we examine the equilibrium output 2 that comes 
about in a spot market equilibrium when producers are risk averse and 
maximise the expected utility of profit. In equilibrium producers charge an 
equilibrium risk premium over and above their basic marginal cost of 
production-this forces the output 2 to lie below x*. Note that in this 
framework if we reinterpret Keynes’ normal backwardation as the risk 
premium received by firms, then Keynes’ estimates of the extent of normal 
backwardation (much higher than 10% [8, p. 1281) may provide 
reasonably accurate estimates of the risk premium added by firms to their 
basic marginal cost of production when they themselves carry fully the 
risks of price fluctuations. 
3. SPOT MARKET EQUILIBRIUM 
This section examines the equilibrium output produced by the m firms 
when the mechanism for selling their output consists solely of a spot 
market; firms are thus not permitted to make forward sales through a 
futures market. We show that a spot market equilibrium exists, that any 
equilibrium output 9 < x* and give conditions for 9 to be unique. The 
framework is illustrated by a simple example. 
3.1. Existence of Spot Market Equilibrium 
Let p(o) denote the spot market price for each unit of output in state 
OEQ then the profit of the firm is given by rc(y, w)=p(o)y-c(y). 
ASSUMPTION 3 (Risk Aversion of Producers). Each of the m producers 
in the industry has a common attitude toward profit risk summarised by a 
von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function u: R + R satisfying (i) 
u( .) E C*(R), (ii) u’(z) > 0, u”(n) < 0, n E R. 
In the spring each firm chooses an output y E R + so as to maximise the 
expected utility of its profit 
WY) = [ ~(P(w)Y - C(Y)) dp(o) 
JR 
(2) 
knowing only the distribution of spot prices 9(w E Q 1 p(w) < a) V a E R + 
that can arise in the fall. The demand price that consumers will pay for the 
total amount x in state o E Q is given by 4(x, w) and satisfies the con- 
ditions of Assumption 2. 
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The random variables that appear in this paper are elements of the 
following space (unless otherwise stated)-the space of real-valued (essen- 
tially) bounded measurable functions defined on Q, denoted by ~Z’~(52). 
The nonnegative orthant is denoted by 9; (Q) = { 5 E Y=(Q) 1 r(o) 3 0 
a.s. }. 
DEFINITION 1. A spot market equilibrium is a pair ( j, 6) E R + x 9 z (Q) 
such that 
(i) the expected utility of profit U(y) is maximised at $ given j?, by 
each firm, 
(ii) the spot market clears almost surely, j?(o) = d(rnj, w) a.s. 
This is a rational expectations equilibrium since firms are assumed to 
correctly anticipate 0 in the sense of knowing its probability distribution. 
Note that by (ii) and Assumption 2(iv), b is a nontrivial random variable. 
PROPOSITION 1. Under Assumptions l-3 there exists a spot market 
equilibrium. 
Proo$ It is easy to show that for any PE Y:(Q) the function 
U(y): R + + R defined by (2) is differentiable. Since U( .) is a concave 
function, an output ,0 > 0 satisfying U’(j) = 0 maximises the expected 
utility of profit. It thus suffices to find a pair (2, p) such that 
A 
(J’ x =o, 
0 P(w) = d(% 0) 
a.s. 
m (3) 
Let ,0x, w) = u’(#(x, w)(x/m) - Wm))(cW, 0) - c’(x/m)) V (4 0) E 
R + x L? and let F(x) = ja f( x, o) dY(o), then in view of (3) it suffices to 
find z?->O such that 
F(2) = 0. (4) 
It follows from Assumptions l-3 that f(0, o) > 0 a.s. and f(a, w) < 0 as. 
where a > 0 is defined by c’(u/m) = Cr. Thus F(0) > 0, F(a) < 0. Sincef(x, o) 
is continuous in x a.s. V x E [0, a] and since there exists fl> 0 such that 
If(x, w)l< b V x E [0, a] a.s., for any sequence x, E [0, a] such that x, + x, 
by the bounded convergence theorem [ 13, p. 2291 
so that F(x,) -+ F(x). Thus F is continuous on [0, a] and there exists 
x E (0, a) such that F(2) = 0. 1 
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3.2. Properties of Spot Market Equilibrium 
PROPOSITION 2. Zf Assumptions l-3 are satisfied then every spot market 
equilibrium output i < x*. 
Proof Let ZZ(x, CD) = C&X, o)(x/m) - c(x/m) and let IZY and 4, denote 
the random variables ZZ(x, . ) and 4(x, . ), x E R +. Then the condition (4) is 
equivalent to the condition 
u’(G(w))(h(o) - 6,) dp(w) = 0 
which in view of (1) is equivalent to 
S’(2) = d(i) (5) 
where 
b(x)= - cov(L u’(n.Y)) 
E(u’(K)) ’ 
.Y 2 0. (6) 
Since for J/m > 0 each firm’s profit is maximised if and only if U’(a/m) = 0, 
,f is a spot market equilibrium output if and only if (5) is satisfied. Since for 
fixed x > 0, u’(Z7,) is a decreasing function of the random variable 4,, by 
an elementary result4 cov(d.,, u’(I7,)) c 0 for x > 0. Since U’(R) > 0, rc E R, 
6(x) >O, x> 0. It is easy to show that S’( .) is continuous and strictly 
decreasing on R+. Thus since S/(.X*) =0 by (5) J-.X*. 1 
Proposition 2 is an extension to the case of equilibrium output of the 
result of Baron [ 1, p. 4671 and Sandmo [ 14, p. 661 which asserts (in its 
general form) that for a ,fixed distribution of prices, the profit maximising 
output of a firm is a decreasing function of the degree of its absolute risk 
aversion. 
Let d(y) denote the risk premium that a firm is prepared to pay to avoid 
the risk of random profit and to obtain instead the expected value of profit 
with certainty, then by definition 
u(E(~.Y)) - A(Y)) = Eu(W)), y>o 
4 PROPOSITION. Let 4, g(qS)~%~(ll). If‘ 9(o~sZI#(w)#$)>O und g(.) is stricrlq 
decreasing, then cov(qb, g(d)) < 0. 
Proof: Let A = {w~Ql~#~(o)=(d}, then .?P(A’)>O. Since g( ‘) is strictly decreasing, 
H(w)=(~(o)-~)(g(~(o))--R(~))<O v UEA’ and H(w)=0 t’ WEA. Since B(A‘)>O, 
0 > In H(w) dip = Q&R(d)) - E(d) QR(@)) - EC(d -d) ~(411 = CM& a(d)). 
FUTURESMARKETS 339 
where n(y) denotes the random variable py - c(y), By equating the lirst-or- 
der conditions for maximising the left and right sides of this expression we 
readily deduce that 
d,(y) = _ COV(P? U’(4Y))) 
E(u’(dy))) . 
Thus 6(x) represents the marginal risk premium when we substitute for p 
the random variable 4,. At the equilibrium output 3, s(J) is thus the 
equilibrium risk premium, the amount charged to consumers on average in 
excess of the basic marginal cost of production c’(i/m) and the basic return 
that producers receive for incurring the risks induced by spot price 
variability. 
Remark. The spot market equilibrium need not be unique. If the risk 
premium function 6(x) is decreasing for some range of output x, then there 
can be multiple spot market equilibria. If 6(x) is a nondecreasing function 
then the spot market equilibrium is unique. A related result is the 
following. 
PROPOSITION 3. Let Assumptions 1-3 hold. rf R(n)= -(u”(n)/u’(n))7c 
< 1 for z> 0, then the spot market equilibrium is unique. 
Proof: By a result of Cheng et al. [4] the firm’s profit maximising out- 
put y(p) is an increasing function of p, in the sense that p(w) >p(w) a.s. 
implies y(d) > y(p). Let J? denote an equilibrium output and let pa denote 
the associated price. Suppose (x’, p,,,) is a second equilibrium with x’ < 3. 
Then p,(w) >P~(w) a.s. by Assumption 2(ii). But then x’ > ,?, contradicting 
x’ < 2. Conversely if x’ > 3. 
EXAMPLE. Let U(Z) = -ePan, a > 0, and let 4(x, o) = p(x) + n(w) where 
p is strictly decreasing, 0 < c’(0) < ~(0) < 00 and 3. is normally distributed 
with zero mean and variance o2 > 0. This is the simplest case of an additive 
random disturbance. On any interval in R + the probability of negative or 
unbounded positive prices can be made arbitrarily small’ by suitable choice 
of the pair (p(. ), a). The risk premium function is increasing 
XER+. (7) 
The unique equilibrium output i > 0 is defined by ~(2) - c’(i/m) = 
or(i/m) a2 and the output x* by p(x*)-c’(x*/m)=O. 
5 Let D < bp(x), 0 < b < 1, VXE I (the interval under consideration). If I= R + let 
0 < p < p(x) Vx E R +. If b = f, the probability of negative prices is less than 10e6. 
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4. SPOT-FUTURES MARKET EQUILIBRIUM 
The object of this and the following section is to examine the impact of 
the introduction of an organised futures exchange on the equilibrium out- 
put of the industry. In addition to selling their output directly on the spot 
market (as in Section 3), firms are given the option to trade in futures con- 
tracts. We introduce a new class of agents, called speculators, who, follow- 
ing the idea of Keynes and Knight, are viewed as specialists in the activity 
of risk bearing. Unlike the producers, whose specialty is the production of 
the commodity under consideration, the speculators deal extensively on 
this and other futures markets. 
4.1. Existence of Spot-Futures Market Equilibrium 
The producers and speculators are the sole agents that trade on the 
organised futures exchange and trading takes place under the following 
conditions. The market is open at two points in time, in the 
spring and in the fall. At both times the same futures contract is traded, 
each contract calling for the delivery of one unit of the commodity in the 
fall. The contracts can be purchased and sold costlessly and in perfectly 
divisible amounts. Whatever position a trader takes in the spring is 
automatically reversed in the fall. Thus each producer sells z futures con- 
tracts in the spring at the (spring) futures price q and buys back z contracts 
in the fall at the (fall) futures price, which by arbitrage coincides with the 
spot price p(o).” 
The profit rc of a producer now comes from two sources: first, the sale of 
the commodity on the spot market, and second, the profit on the transac- 
tion in the futures market. Thus 
4Y3 z, 0) = P(W) y - c(y) + z(q - P(W)), (y, Z)E R+ x R. 
Similarly the profit rc of a speculator comes from two sources: first, the 
profit on the transactions in this futures market n,(t, w) = [(p(o) - q), and 
second, the profits from transactions on n - 1 other markets xi, i = 2,..., n, 
which are taken as exogenously given 
x(<, WI = 5(P(O) - 4) + %(~I + .’ + %A~), (E R. 
The exogenous profits are random variables satisfying 
‘In practice there is often a small random difference (known as basis) between the fall 
futures price and the (fall) spot price. When the analysis is extended to include this basis risk 
explicitly, the basic simplifying step in the analysis, Lemma 2, is no longer valid. We thus con- 
fine the analysis to the idealised case of zero basis risk. 
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TC~E 9I(Q) = (q 1 jQ Iv](w)( &Y(o) < co > and -CO < y < n,(o) a.s., i = l,..., IZ. 
The output and hedging decision of a producer thus reduces to 
sup WY, z)= sup s u(n(y, z, WI) dP(o). (@I (.~a,=) E R + x R (y,z)tR+xR R 
Speculators are concerned with the average profit IZ= z/n that they earn 
on the n markets. In addition they are risk averse. 
ASSUMPTION 4. (Risk Aversion of Speculators). Each of the s 
speculators has a common attitude toward average profit risk summarised by 
a utility function w: R -+ R satisfying (i) w(.)E C2(R), (ii) w’(n) >O, 
w”(Z7)<0, II=x/nER. 
With this assumption the trading decision of a speculator reduces to 
where the integral is well-defined since Z7([, o) E d%;(Q) and b < Z7(5, co) a.s. 
for some constant b > - 00. 
The nature of the equilibria that emerge on the joint system of spot and 
futures markets depends on the nature of the stochastic dependence between 
the random spot price p and the random average profit A, = (l/n) C;= 2 xi 
earned by the speculators on the n - 1 other markets on which they trade. 
Without entering into the qualifying conditions that need to be made, if 
there is sufficient positive dependence7 between the random variables p and 
A,, then the equilibrium sale of futures contracts by producers may 
become negative (2~0): speculators will in essence be entering the futures 
market to shift their risks to producers. We will call such an equilibrium an 
improper equilibrium. Thus in a proper equilibrium Z> 0 and producers 
shift part of their risks to speculators. If there is sufficient negative depen- 
dence between p and A,, then the equilibrium sale of futures contracts may 
exceed output (2 > y). We will call such an equilibrium an overhedging 
equilibrium, referring to the case where 5 <j as a normal hedging 
equilibrium. 
A particularly simple and direct proof of the existence of a spot-futures 
market equilibrium can be obtained if we restrict the futures trading of 
producers so that 0 <z < y. It is clear that with this restriction an 
equilibrium that would otherwise appear as an improper equilibrium will 
appear as an equilibrium with Z = 0, while an overhedging equilibrium will 
appear as an equilibrium with Z = j. Since this restriction does not alter the 
‘See Definition 3 below. 
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qualitative properties of the equilibrium that we seek to obtain, we may 
without loss of generality adopt it in the analysis that follows. The 
producer’s problem (a) thus reduces to 
sup WY, z). (“U 
(I;,z)E R+ x [O,y] 
Following the standard procedure in equilibrium theory we impose a tem- 
porary bound (d) on the trading of each speculator. This leads to the 
problem 
(-Iy-‘1 
DEFINITION 2. A spot-futures market equilibrium (with speculators 
trading on n - 1 other markets) is a pair 
such that 
6) (Y,,, 2,) solves (@‘I with (P, q) = (P,, 4,,), 
(ii) [, solves (W) with (p, q) = (p,, q,,), 
(iii) the spot market clears almost surely, PJco) = #(my,,, co) a.s., 
(iv) the futures market clears in the spring and in the fall, m5, = s[,,. 
As in the definition of a spot market equilibrium, the expectations of agents 
are rational. Similarly (iii) and Assumption 2(iv) imply P,, is a nontrivial 
random variable. Lemmas 1-3, the proofs of which are given in the Appen- 
dix, establish the basic properties of the solutions of (a’) and (“I+‘“‘) which 
are needed to establish the existence of an equilibrium (Proposition 4). 
LEMMA 1. Under Assumptions 1 and 3, if (p, q)E Y:(Q) x R,, then 
there exists a unique solution of (92’). 
LEMMA 2. Let (y*(p, q), z*(p, q)) denote the optimal solution in Lemma 
1. Zfz*(p,q)>O, then y*(p,q)=C’(q). 
Lemma 2 asserts that when a firm trades on the futures market, its output 
y* is no longer influenced (as in the previous section) by the distribution of 
the spot price p, but depends solely on the (spring) futures price q. This 
result was first obtained by Danthine [S, p. 821. Since the futures trading 
of producers is still influenced by their attitude toward risk, it is clear that 
in equilibrium the futures price and hence their production decision is 
indirectly influenced by their attitude toward risk. This property does, 
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however, as we show in Section 5, when taken in conjunction with exten- 
sive diversification on the part of speculators, lead to an equilibrium which 
is independent of the attitude toward risk of producers. 
Remark 1. In view of Lemma 2, if (p, S) E 92 (Q) x R, with S = c’(y) 
for some j > 0, and if the solution Z of 
sup s U(P(fJJ) j - c(Y) + 4q -P(W))) @P(o) ZE [O.y] R 
satisfies Z>O, then (y*(p, q), z*(p, 4)) = (Y, 2). 
LEMMA 3. Under Assumption 4, if (p, q) E 2: (Q) x R + , then there 
exists a unique solution of (TV). 
We are now in a position to show that there is at least one well-defined 
equilibrium. Note that the equilibrium depends on the number of markets 
on which speculators trade-a property that is shown to have important 
consequences in Section 5. 
PROPOSITION 4 (Spot-Futures Market Equilibrium). Zf Assumptions 
14 hold and speculators trade on n 3 1 markets, then there exists a 
spot-futures market equilibrium with 0 c X, c a. 
Proof Let (y*(p, q), z*(p, q)) and r*(p, q) denote the solutions of (a’) 
and (w’) whose existence is asserted by Lemmas 1 and 3. We let b = a/m 
be defined by c’(b) = C? and consider the following one-parameter family of 
prices 
(P,(~J), q(y)) = (ti(my, m), c’(y)) a.s., ye [0, b]. 
The idea is to find an output jj E [0, b] such that 
mz*(z+ q(Y)) - kt*(p,, q(Y)) =Q 
For fixed y E [0, b] let z(y) denote the solution of 
sup s u(P.,(w) y -c(y) + z(q(y) -P,.(O))) dp(o). (9) ZE CO,.v] a 
BY Remark 1 if y>O and Z(Y) ’ 0, then (Y*(P,, q(y)), 
z*(p,, q(y))) = (y, z(y)). By the continuity of u( .), b( ., o), and c’( .) and 
by the bounded convergence theorem, the integral in (9) is a continuous 
function of y on [0, b]. By the maximum theorem [2, p. 1161, 
z: [0, b] -+ R+ is a continuous function. Since by Assumptions 1 and 2 
109.‘107,1-23 
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p,(o) > q(0) as. and PJO) <q(b) as., it follows that z(0) = 0, z(b) = 6. Let 
t(y) denote the solution of 
SUP 
1 ( 
!A’ f (PA4 - 9(Y)) + 4w) dP(o) ctr-4.41 n (10) 
where A, = (l/n) C;=, xi. By the continuity of WI(.), d(., w), and cl(.) and 
by the dominated convergence theorem, the integral in (10) is a continuous 
function of y on [0, b]. By the maximum theorem, 5: [0, b] -+ [-A, A] is 
a continuous function. It is clear that l(O) = d, t(b) = -A. But then 
mz(0) - ~((0) = -sA < 0, mz(b) - st(b) = mb + sA > 0. 
By the intermediate value theorem there exists VE (0, b) such that 
mz( jj) - st(y) = 0. Choose A > a/s, then 
implies -A < t(j) < A so that t(j) is a solution of the unconstrained 
problem in (lo), and hence is a solution of (W). Thus 
((Y,? z,> L)> (IL, 4n)) = ((Y, ‘m, 5(L’))> (PC, 4(Y))) 
satisfies (8) and (i)-(iv) in Definition 2 and hence is an equilibrium. The 
case where z(y) = 0 is readily shown to be an equilibrium. 1 
4.2. Properties qf Spot-Futures Market Equilibrium 
A number of simple properties of an equilibrium can now be established. 
One would expect that if there is positive trading, since part of the price 
risks will be carried by speculators, output should increase relative to the 
spot market equilibrium level. 
PROPOSITION 5. Let the spot market equilibrium output i be unique. If X, 
is the output in a proper spot-futures market equilibrium then 2 < X,. 
Proof: Consider the problem of maximising 
subject to 0 < z < x,/m. Since Z, > 0, U’(0) I== 0. Thus the function F( . ) used 
to define the spot market equilibrium in (4) satisfies F(X,) = -U’(O) < 0. 
Since F( .) is continuous on [O, a], F(0) > 0 and A is the unique solution of 
F(i) = 0, it follows that .x? <x,. i 
FUTURESMARKETS 345 
We have already asserted that the stochastic dependence between the 
spot price 4 and the average profits A, earned by speculators on the (n - 1) 
other markets on which they trade has an important influence on the 
properties of an equilibrium. The following definition makes precise this 
concept, which is a natural extension of the concept of stochastic indepen- 
dence for a pair of random variables (see Lehmann [lo]). 
DEFINITION 3. A pair of random variables 4, $: Q -+ R is said to be 
positively (negatively) dependent if for all (u, b) E R2 
with strict inequality for some (a, /I) E R2. We write (4, II/) are p.d. (n.d.), 
respectively. 
Remark 2. It is readily shown that if (4, Ic/) are p.d. (n.d.) then (d,f(ll/)) 
are n.d. (p.d.) iff(.) is a decreasing function. Also if (4, $) are p.d. (n.d.), 
then COV(C$, $) >O (CO). When (4, $) are joint normally distributed (see 
the example below) then (4, $) are p.d. (n.d.) if and only if cov(& $)>O 
(CO). 
If (4, A,) are negatively dependent then one would expect speculators to 
be willing to trade on the long side of the market since they can reduce the 
variability of their portfolios by buying contracts on the futures market. 
PROPOSITION 6. ,If (4, A,,) are negatively dependent or independent, then 
a spot-futures market equilibrium is a proper equilibrium. 
Proof. Let r =p, - qn and consider the function IV(t) defined by (-Iy-). 
First suppose E(r) > 0. Then IV’(O) = E(w’(A,) r) 2 E(w’(A,)) E(r) > 0 
since (r, w’(A,)) are p.d. or independent. Since IV’([,) =0 and since 
w”(. ) < 0 implies I+“(. ) is strictly decreasing, [,, > 0. Now suppose E(r) < 0 
and consider the function U( y, z) defined by (%). Then 
U?(y,,y,)= -u’(jncjn-c(jn))E(r)30. Sinceu”(.)<Oimplies U,(y,, .)is 
strictly decreasing, Z, >yn if it were not constrained to satisfy Z, < y,, 
implying 5, = Y,, = x,/m > 0. Thus in either case tiz, = s[,, > 0. 1 
It is easy to see that if (4, A,) are independent then {, <x* and X, is a 
normal hedging equilibrium, since r,, > 0 implies qn < E( ii,,). The example 
introduced in Section 3.2 can be extended to the spot-futures market 
equilibrium of this section and can be used to illustrate further properties 
of an equilibrium. 
EXAMPLE. Let ~(71) = -e-*‘, 01 > 0, w(n)= -epgn, /3>0, 
4(x, o) = ,u(x) + A(w) where (p(. ), n) satisfy the conditions given in Section 
3.2 and let (2, x2 ,..., 71,) be joint normally distributed random variables. Let 
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A,, = (l/n) c;=, n;, V(A,) = a;n, cov((b, A,) = a@” = cov(A, A,) = (TEA,, 
V(A) = cr2. Let (q, E(p), CJ~) denote the futures price and the mean and 
variance of the spot price, then the output and supply of futures contracts 
of each producer satisfy 
C’(Y) =4, 
while each speculator’s demand for futures contracts is given by 
<= & (E(p)-q)-s 
( ! 6 
where gpA, is the covariance between the spot price and A,. Equilibrium on 
the spot market implies E(p) = p(x), dP = CI where x = my. Equilibrium on 
the futures market requires mz = s&if we use the function S defined in (1) 
so that S’(x) = p(x) - c’(x/mtthis condition reduces to a condition detin- 
ing the equilibrium output X, 
9(X,) =&3(x,) + 6 (11) 
Equation (11) is the basic equilibrium condition expressing equality 
between the expected rate of rettlrn S’ and the equilibrium risk premium 
_S + 8. When there are no speculators (S = 0), d(x) = 6(x) defined by (7) and 
S= 0 so that X = 2. When speculators are present the equilibrium risk 
premium (and hence the bias in the futures price) is composed of two 
terms. The first term d(x) measures the premium required jointly by 
producers and speculators to cover the risks arising from the variability of 
the spot price itself (a’): this may be called the idiosyncratic risk premium. 
The second term S measures the premium required by speculators to cover 
the other risk involved in introducing futures contracts into their existing 
portfolio An, namely, the one that arises from the covariance (a,,“) 
between 4 and A ,,: this may be called the covariance risk premium. If 
speculators hold well-diversified portfolios then the first type of risk is 
diversified away since 
J(x) -+ 0, s -+ /?a,,* asn-tcc 
provided o+,~ -+ odA e as n -+ co: thus the idiosyncratic risk which is the basic 
risk that is present in the spot market equilibrium is diverstfied away in a 
joint spot-futures market equilibrium when n -+ co. If in addition 4 and A,, 
are asymptotically independent (ad,. = 0) then the covariance risk 
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premium vanishes so that the equilibrium risk premium _S + 6 is zero. In 
this case X, + x* as n + cc where x* maximises (1). 
A similar result holds when the number of speculators is increased, since 
In this case the idiosyncratic risk becomes subdivided among a large num- 
ber of speculators and once again in the joint spot-futures market 
equilibrium only the nature of the covariance risk matters.8 
5. DIVERSIFICATION OF RISK 
The example of the previous section suggests a number of interesting 
asymptotic properties of the joint spot-futures market equilibrium which 
arise from asymptotic properties of the basic equilibrium risk premium 
expression (11). This expression has much in common with the basic risk 
premium expressions that are derived in the theory of capital asset pricing 
under uncertainty (Sharpe [ 151 and Ross [ 121). The affinity is closest with 
the arbitrage pricing theory of Ross where the common random factor (or 
index) plays a role similar to that of A, in our model. It will be recalled 
that in Ross’ analysis as the number of assets is increased idiosyncratic 
risks are diversified away and only factor-dependent covariance risks 
remain in the resulting asymptotic pricing relations. The object of this sec- 
tion is to examine briefly the consequences of such a Zurge market argument 
for the equilibrium, and in particular the eqilibrium output, of the previous 
section. 
5.1. Large Market Argument 
To make the large market argument work in the present context we need 
to assume that the random return A, obtained by speculators settles down 
in a suitable way as the number of markets on which they trade is 
increased. We require that A, converges in probability to a random 
variable A* which thus represents the asymptotic average profit that they 
earn on other markets in the large market economy. 
s In the present framework _S is always nonnegative. We have shown elsewhere that when 
processors are introduced who use the commodity as an input, if they also hedge on the 
futures market and if q4 is interpreted as the excess demand function of agents who do not 
trade on the futures market, then the sign of _S depends on the sign of the difference between 
the output of producers and the input demanded by processors. Thus the sign of the idiosyn- 
cratic risk premium depends on the basic imbalance between short and long hedgers on the 
futures markef. However, even when long hedgers are introduced in this way _S + 0 as n + co, 
so that couariance risk is the basic determinant of the risk premium in a large market economy. 
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Recall that a sequence of real-valued random variables It/, is said to con- 
verge in probability to $* (written $, jp I/I*) if 
g(W E 521 itin - ‘b*(W)1 2 E) -+ 0 as n --f KI for every E > 0. 
ASSUMPTION 5 (Asymptotic Average Profit). A, +p A* as n + CO. 
The behavior of asymptotic equilibrium output depends on the nature of 
the stochastic dependence between 4 and A*. 
PROPOSITION 7. (Asymptotic Equilibrium Output). Let Assumptions 
1-5 be satisfied. If X, denotes the output in a spot-futures market equilibrium 
when speculators trade on n markets, then 
2, + x as n-+cO 
where (i) X=x* if (4, A*) are independent, (ii) x < (> ) x* if (4, A*) are 
positively (negatively) dependent. 
ProojI By Proposition 4, for every integer n 2 1 there exists a 
spot-futures market equilibrium with output satisfying 0 <X, < a, 
n = 1, 2,.... The sequence {X-, };= 1 thus has at least one point of 
accumulation X. By picking a subsequence we may assume X, -+X as 
n -+ co. By the continuity of I( ., w) and cl(.), the sequence of spot and 
futures prices satisfies 
Pn(w) = 4G,, 0) -+ 4(-t 0) =P(o), VCOESZ (12) 
(13) 
By virtue of condition (ii) in Definition 2, each speculator’s optimal 
decision [, must satisfy the first-order condition 
L - 
-$P~(Q+CJ+A~(W) (P,(o~)-q,)d9(0)=0. 
Using (12), (13) and following the procedure in the proof of Proposition 2, 
this equation can be written as follows: 
&X,)-c’ 3 = 
0 
-cov(~~,~ W’W~X#~, - iz”) + ‘4,)) = d,(% r ) (14) 
m mwuo(4, - qJ + A,)) n’ n * 
Since (L/n)(4,, - 4J +p 0, it follows from Assumption 5 that 
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Since by Assumption 4, w’( . ) is a continuous decreasing function on R and 
since y < A,(o) a.s., (15) is readily seen to imply that 
w’ ( $7L)+A.)+ w’(A*) asn-+co. P 
By (14), (16) and the bounded convergence theorem 
lim 6,(X,, g,) = -cov(L w’(A*)) 
E(w’(A*)) 
=6*(x). 
Il-* 
(16) 
Taking limits of both sides of (14), recalling that S’(x) = 4(x) - c’(x/m) 
and using (17) gives the basic asymptotic equilibrium condition 
S’(X) = 6*(.?). (18) 
(i) If (4, A*) are independent random variables, then (4, w’(A*)) are 
independent random variables, so that cov(#, w’(A*)) = 0 and C?*(X) = 0. 
Thus X=x*. 
(ii) By Remark 2 if (4, A*) are positively (negatively) dependent, 
since w’(. ) is strictly decreasing (4, w’(A*)) are negatively (positively) 
dependent, implying cov(& w’(A*)) < 0 (> 0) and 6*(X) > 0 ( < 0). Since 
S’( . ) is strictly decreasing on R + , ( 18) implies X < ( > ) x*. 1 
5.2. Economic Interpretation 
An intuitive economic interpretation of Proposition 7 may be given as 
follows. Firms are interested in using the futures market for hedging. By 
virtue of their production activity, firms hold long positions on the spot 
market and are interested in holding short positions on the futures market. 
By virtue of their investment activity on the (n - 1) other markets on which 
they trade, speculators start off with an initial portfolio summarised by the 
average return obtained on these markets A,. Since the firms as hedgers 
are on the selling side of the (spring) futures market, the speculators will 
need to be buyers. A speculator entering the futures market as a buyer 
incurs two risks. The first arises from the variability of 4 itself and may be 
called the idiosyncratic risk. The second arises from the stochastic depen- 
dence between 4 and A,, and may be called the stochastic dependence risk. 
Equation (17) asserts that the idiosyncratic risk disappears as the speculators 
hold progressively more widely divers$ed portfolios. 
The asymptotic equilibrium risk premium 6* measures the risk premium 
that speculators require for carrying the only risk that remains, the 
stochastic dependence risk. If the stochastic dependence between C$ and A* 
is positive then when speculators enter the futures market as buyers and 
add 4 to their portfolios, the risk of their portfolios is increased. As risk 
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averse agents the speculators require compensation for this risk carrying 
activity-a positive average profit 6* is the equilibrium reward they obtain 
for each unit invested. If the stochastic dependence between 4 and A* is 
negative, then the futures market in essence provides a hedging service for 
the speculators, since adding 0 to their portfolios reduces the risk of their 
portfolios. This is a service for which speculators are prepared to pay on 
average-a property that reflects itself in a negative asymptotic risk 
premium. 
Finally, and perhaps most surprisingly, when there is no stochastic 
dependence between 4 and A*-in short, when t$ and A* are indepen- 
dent-the asymptotic risk premium is zero. The idiosyncratic risk, which in 
the spot market equilibrium of Section 3 was carried by producers effec- 
tively charging consumers an insurance fee over and above the basic 
marginal cost of production, is now in the joint spot-futures market 
equilibrium of a large market economy diversified away through the 
risk-spreading portfolio activity of speculators. In the limit speculators in 
essence provide costless price insurance to producers. 
6. WELFARE EFFECT OF FUTURES MARKET 
The original motivation for introducing futures markets was the idea 
that these markets would provide a mechanism for reducing the cost of risk 
bearing-a cost otherwise incurred directly by producers over and above 
the basic costs of production. By reducing overall costs of production 
producers and consumers were expected to be better off and since 
speculators would only trade if such trading made them better off, the 
introduction of a futures market should act to the mutual benefit of 
producers, consumers and speculators. We shall show that such an 
argument is indeed valid in a proper equilibrium (Zn > 0 and hence X, > 2) 
provided the equilibrium output X, lies above a critical level i or 
equivalently provided the introduction of a futures market leads to a suf- 
ficient reduction in the equilibrium risk costs (Proposition 8). 
Introducing a futures market can, however, lead to an increase in the 
cost of risk bearing. If there is sufficient positive dependence between q5 and 
A,, then speculators can induce producers to take long positions on the 
futures market (Z, ~0 and hence X, < 2). Producers far from using the 
futures market as a hedging market are adding to their existing spot 
market risks by carrying risks for speculators. In the limiting equilibrium of 
Proposition 7 speculators, however, obtain no increase in welfare since 
lim, _ 3c lV([,) = W(0). Since output is reduced consumers are worse off 
and in some cases producers may be worse off. Such a situation is similar 
to Hart’s example [7] where the addition of a new market in an incom- 
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plete market framework leads to a Pareto inferior allocation. The welfare 
effect of a futures market thus depends on whether the cost of risk bearing 
is reduced or increased and this in turn depends on the nature of the 
stochastic dependence between the spot price and prices on other markets 
on which speculators trade. 
To establish welfare results we need to make explicit the utility maximis- 
ing behaviour of consumers. To keep the framework simple let all k con- 
sumers be identical. Each consumer faces a vector of random prices 
P(o) E R’, for the final goods and has a random income M(o) > 0, o E Q 
where P,E Y;(Q), i= l,..., r and ME 9’2 (Q). Since each consumer is 
assumed to know the state of nature o ESZ at the time the consumption 
decision is made, the consumer’s problem reduces to the following standard 
maximum problem for each state of nature o E Q 
max 4x), B(P(w),Wo))= {x-i lP(4xGfW). xtNfYw).,+f(w)) 
Let x(P(w), M(u)) denote the consumer’s resulting demand in the state of 
nature o E Sz. The consumer’s indirect utility function is given by 
4P(W)? M(o)) = 4x(P(w), M(o))), CoErn. 
ASSUMPTION 6. (i) Each consumer has a preference ordering over ran- 
dom price systems represented by the expected indirect utility function 
EVP(o), M(o)). 
(ii) The utility function v: R’, --f R is continuous, strictly increasing 
and strictly quasi-concave. 
The following proposition asserts that whenever the trading of 
speculators leads to a sufficient increase in the equilibrium output (X, > x) 
or equivalently to a sufficient reduction in the equilibrium risk cost 
(6(X,) < s’(i) where 6(X,) = E(p,) - qn) then the introduction of a futures 
market leads to a Pareto improvement. 
PROPOSITION 8. Let Assumptions 1-6 be satisfied. There exists an output 
k E (2, 6) where c’(b/m) = $(a) such that whenever the equilibrium output 2, 
exceeds < then the introduction of a futures market leads to a Pareto 
improvement. 
Proof The welfare of speculators is increased since by the optimality 
and uniqueness of [,,, W(tn)> W(0). Let P=(P,,P), x=(x1,1?) and let 
the first good be the commodity under consideration. c$( ., w) is the inverse 
of the market demand function kX,(., P(o), M(o)) and PI(w) = 4(x, w) is 
the spot price in state WE 52 when equilibrium output is x. Let 
v(x)= EV($(x, w), p(o), M(o)), then since C$ is a strictly decreasing 
function of x and since Assumption 6(ii) implies V is a strictly decreasing 
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function of P,, v(x) is a strictly increasing function of x. Since X, > k > -2, 
~(2,) > v(a) so consumers are better off. Let n, and 7r/ denote the random 
profits earned by the representative producer in the spot market and 
spot-futures market equilibria, respectively, and let Z7s and I$ denote their 
certainty equivalents, u(fl,,) = E~4(n,~(o)), u(U,) = Eu(7rI(o)). Clearly 
Eu(n,(w))> Eu(x,&w)) if and only if l$-- l7, >O since u(.) is strictly 
increasing by Assumption 3. The producer’s futures trade (2,) can be 
decomposed into the sum of a hedging transaction (x,/m) and a purely 
speculative trade (rS,) 
+r”+o,, 40) = uq, -PJw)), OEQ m (19) 
where s(o) is the profit on the purely speculative component of the trade in 
state COEQ. Let S denote the certainty equivalent of s, 
~(a, + S) = Eu(a, + s(w)) where a, = ij,(.f,/m) - c(.f,/m) and let y(rc,), ~(71~) 
and y(s) denote the risk premiu implied by I7,, Z7, and S (thus 
17, = E(rr,) - y(n,), etc.) Since y(rcr) = y(s) it is immediate that 
where 
Since 8, # ( = ) 0 according as x, # (= ) x*, it follows from the optimality 
and uniqueness of 8, that S > ( = ) 0 according as Z,( # ) = x*. Since c’( . ) is 
strictly increasing by Assumption 1, it follows that $( .) is strictly 
increasing. Thus if $(x) = 0 then U,- 17,Y > 0, V X, > x. Such an i exists and 
satisfies ,? < x < b where c’(b/m) = $( Z since $(a)= -S<O, $(b)>O and ) 
$(. ) is continuous by the continuity of c’( . ). 1 
Remark. The intuition behind the result is clear. This case will arise in 
particular when the return A, earned by speculators on the other markets 
on which they trade is sufficiently negatively dependent on the spot price 4. 
In such a stochastic environment speculators are effectively able to use the 
futures market as a hedging medium, reducing the risk of their portfolios 
by taking long positions. For this service they are glad to pay a premium 
-6(X,). This premium serves to increase the futures price (and hence effec- 
tively to subsidise the production of firms) to such an extent that the sure 
profit that producers can earn by selling all their output forward at the 
futures price qn (as in Eq. (19)) exceeds the certainty equivalent of their 
spot market profit 17,. This is the meaning of the equation 
tj = (ZI,- S) - 17, > 0. Since the producer always attaches a positive value 
to the random profit earned on the purely speculative trade f?, provided 
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0, #O (S> (=) 0 accordingly as Z,# (=) x*) we are assured that 
Z7,- l7, > 0. Thus producers gain and consumers gain from the increased 
output which is available at a reduced average price. The introduction of 
the futures market has thus acted to the mutual benefit of producers, con- 
sumers and speculators. 
Remark. In a proper equilibrium (2, > 2) when the equilibrium output 
X, lies below ,? while consumers and speculators gain, producers may lose. 
Leaving aside the speculators, whose gains go to zero as n -+ rc, since 
lim, _ m I+‘(<,,) = W(O), we may ask under what conditions consumers can 
compensate producers. When the market structure changes, equilibrium 
output changes from 2 to X, leading to a change in the spot price from 
P,(w) = fjq.2, w) to P\(o) = 4(x,, co). Let P(0) = (PI(o), B(w)), 
P’(o) = (P;(o), P(m)), then the gain to each consumer from the introduc- 
tion of a futures market is given by the compensated variation in income N 
defined by EV(P’(o), M(w)- N)=EV(P(o), M(w)). The loss L incurred 
by each producer is defined by Eu(rtJw) + L) = E~(rr,(c~)). The Kaldor 
criterion for a potential Pareto improvement requires that 
9 = kN - mL > 0. The fall in the spot price P,(w) -+ P;(o) leads to a ran- 
dom consumer surplus gain defined by 
l 
P;(w) 
a(w) = X,(P, 7 b)? M(o)) dP, 3 olEl-2 p,( u) 
c 
Let A denote the certainty equivalent of cx (EV(P’(o), M(w)-A)= 
EV(P’(o), M(w) - M(W))) then one can show using Willig’s result [ 173 that 
N = A - E, where E 2 0 (for a normal good) is the overestimate arising from 
the income effect. Let r(a) denote the consumer’s risk premium associated 
with CC, A = E(U) -y(a), then N=E(a)- (E+ ~(a)). If each producer has 
decreasing absolute risk aversion, then -L b Z7f- 17,s = $ + S so that 9 > 0 
if kE(cr)+m(lC/ + S) > k(.s+ y(a)). Furthermore it is easy to see that 
kE(cx)+m($+S)>O whenever X,>X *. Thus if the value (N) to each con- 
sumer of the introduction of a futures market lies sufficiently close to the 
expected consumer surplus’ (E(E)) and if producers have decreasing 
y In the example of Section 4.2 where 4(x, o) = n(x) + ,X(o) (this case is often useful as an 
approximation) the consumer surplus is nonrandom so that y(cc) = 0. In this case the standard 
deterministic condition that the proportion of the consumer’s income spent on the commodity 
be sufficiently small gives the result. As a second case, suppose income is nonrandom and sup- 
pose the vectors of prices can be decomposed as P = (PO, P*) where P” (P*) is the vector of 
prices that are random (nonrandom). Let the marginal utility of income V, be independent of 
P”, then V(P, M) =f(P) + h(P*, M) and the definition of the certainty equivalent of A reduces 
to h(Pb, M-A) =Eh(Pb, M-a(o)). If the consumer’s relative risk aversion with respect to 
income is bounded above -(hYM/hM) A4g p, then if each consumer is sufficiently wealthy 
and if his expenditure on this commodity is sufficiently small in each state of nature, then 
E + y(a) can be made arbitrarily small. 
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absolute risk aversion then there is a potential Pareto improvement 
whenever X, 2 x* or equivalently whenever 6(X,) < 6(x*) = 0. This result 
when applied to the asymptotic output X of Proposition 7 gives conditions 
under which in the independent and negatively dependent cases the 
introduction of a futures market leads to a potential Pareto improvement. 
APPENDIX 
Proof of Lemma 1. It is straightforward to show that U( .) is differen- 
tiable on R$ . Let p = ess sup p(o) so that p(w) 6 p as. By Assumption 
l(iii) there exists y, > 0 such that c’( y,) > p. But then V z E R ’ 
Z))(P(O) - C’(Y,)) dP(w) 
d 
I 
u’(n(w Y,, Z))(P - C’(Y,)) dP(w) < 0. 
R 
The concavity of U( .) implies U,( ., z) is nonincreasing. Since z E [0, y] any 
solution to (a’) must lie in the region [0, y,] x [0, y,]. The result follows 
from the continuity of V( . ). Uniqueness follows from the strict concavity of 
4.1. I 
Proof of Lemma 2. Let ys=y-~20. Then V(y,z)= V(yJ,z)= 
jn u(qz +p(w) ys - c(z + Y,~)) &Y(o). If z* > 0, then the optimality of 
(y*, z*) implies 
K(y:,z*)=(q-c’(z*+y:))J u’(qz*+p(w)y,*-c(z*+y,*))d9(w)=o. 
R 
Since u’( .) > 0 by Assumption 3, q - c’(z* + y,*) = 0. 1 
Proof of Lemma 3. Since rr, E 2’,(Q) and y <rr;(o) a.s., i= l,..., n, it 
follows by applying the dominated convergence theorem that 
W(<,) + W(t) whenever [,, + 4. Existence follows from the compactness 
of [--A, d], and uniqueness from the strict concavity of W(t). 1 
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